Warning: Meta-theory on theory and the shape and processes of thinking, which is sparked by my reactions to reading things and the desire to get thoughts down quickly, and which is quite abstract and not fully explained as a result.
I find that my mind often operates on a few parallel tracks at the same time – there will a specific object of inquiry, be it a law, an image, a story, or a line of argument, and then there will be thinking about the framework of judgment through which I am analysing the object, and there will also be thinking about the form of the analysis, the tools I am using and then what kind of world that makes and what objects can inhabit that world. It seems to be a kind of fractal shape, one point from which all sorts of thoughts can bloom. There are theory labels I can attach to this, but for the purposes of a blog post, I just want to unpack some of the senses and affects of these processes and go towards articulating some ethics in these operations of analysis.
I could abstract it this way: object <–> politics/desire <–> world/form
Or, this way: object <–> context <–> consequences of the thought/form
Each step out from the specific object of inquiry connects it to a broader set of arguments. They are somewhat flippant categories, not well bounded and which mediate each other constantly. Frameworks of judgement belongs under politics and desire because they almost always express an idea of what is good and beautiful that we want to preserve for the things we like and protect from being applied to the things we don’t like: My favourite music is good because it fulfils the criteria I am applying to it and theirs is bad because it doesn’t and you agree with me, because we have great taste. And then someone else comes along to say, no, actually this person is completely wrong because of this other set of criteria and you, audience, agree with me because you can see now how our taste is superior.
What I am getting at is a sense of competition over the subject positions of the ‘I’, the audience and the Other that takes place through trying to get the frameworks of judgement that you prefer to be the ones that matter and that they matter through the quantity of people who you can convert to the subject position of being the we that excludes the them. The basic form of this kind of argumentation and analysis doesn’t require any values except choice. This level of analysis of both culture and politics is particularly well suited to capitalism and its content-attention platforms – political and aesthetic ideas are commodities to be circulated for consumption and the reaction to them produces more commodities. That’s not to say that there are not differences in those ideas and reasons why some are more just or interesting or have a stronger claim to knowledge, but that is besides the point of how they function. The key value is hidden in plain sight – more circulation.
The way in which this level of analysis might be saved from arbitrariness and mere preference is in examining the kinds of conditions each iteration creates and the kinds of worlds or forms that those conditions make possible. Are there differences between local and universal applications of these frameworks? Does the iteration of a use of form repeat and re-affirm something undesirable or does it change the conditions? Does it incohere the criteria within our frameworks of judgment? What possibilities does the form of the framework make available?
Causes to think of these things: How does change occur? How might the practices of all those involved in law use its power to change the terms of its interpretation, and to change what matters and who lives and dies under legal conditions without recognition? How do we avoid the mistake of redrawing the boundary only to exclude a different Other? How might something like possession and property be seen and analysed for how they are concepts that found and make sense of capitalist legal systems – a foundational logic that sees its effects in classic colonialism (expropriation of land and people), neocolonialism (expropriation of labour power, resources and the differential division of rights) – and as ways in which the oppressed have also used the force of law to take self-possession through asserting the promise of the rule of law’s universality? The law is janus-faced and has many uses but I am not sure that it can be completely possessed – the openness of its language and aesthetics means that whilst historically, most legal cases affirm and reify some hierarchy of relationships, it also contains the potential for different uses, relationships and conditions that may nullify the axes of oppression. This is my view of language too as the system of signification within which law works.
In recent times I have been dwelling on the idea of dualist versus dialectical structures of thought.1 I will roughly define this thusly: a dualistic point is one that posits that which is excluded from a concept as fundamentally outside and that which causes contradiction as an external imposition; a pollution. A dialectical point is one which takes the contradiction as internal to the concept. To illustrate (and please forgive me if I am wrong), a dualistic view of law as a self-contained system would see politics as a pollution that enters the law through improper means. A dialectical view would include the contradiction of not-law within the concept of law. In the dualistic view, it would be possible to see the process by which politics becomes law and law is mobilised as politics as an oscillation of heterogeneous forces through history. Competition. Contingency. Preference. An endless process of redefining the pollutant; the external thing that wrecks the unity of the preferred concept.
At this point, I simply want to say that dualist types of analysis work at some scales but ironically closes off the path of escape by assuming that there is an external position. The external position is occupied by both the things we do not like (racism, classism etc) and by us – the critic looking in.
Perhaps my ambivalence about it as a form is that it does not seem complete. It is oppositional in content only, but operating the same as a form that founds what we ought to do in re-aligning the boundaries of exclusion.
I take my cue from my encounter with genre theory – how does the inclusion of new texts into a genre change the category of recognition? It is an acknowledging that the objects and language that I am working with are ways of exercising power and a necessary belief that changing the conditions requires building and using power. It is a belief that legal power’s use by powerful people is dominant throughout history but is not an inevitable necessity of law. It is the banal statement that law is often unjust but it is also sometimes just and sometimes it also contains both – local relief for specific participants and re-iteration of colonial logic/the right to decide in the institution that creates the logic. It is noticing that the law’s universality binds the state too – that the localised victory for a specific claimant can create a rule that transforms how the type of legal subject is mediated by the law. As someone who has spent all of my adult life in learning and making knowledge about the law, I admit that I probably cannot distinguish between my attachment to the law and a pragmatic analysis of its uses. I hope that thinking law both in terms of what it does as specific iterations and in terms of what it makes available through its form2 might engender better analysis beyond reacting to (and inevitably flinching away from) discomfort.
How do I sustain the tension? What do I want to produce?
- Todd McGowan and Ryan Engley, ‘Dualism and Multiplicity’, Why Theory podcast (2022) ↩︎
- On form, see Anna Kornbluh, The Order of Forms (2019, Chicago University Press) ↩︎





